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BANKING, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND INVESTMENT SECURITIES
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PAUl. D.

CARRINGTON*

The banking, commercial paper and investment securities provisions
-of the Uniform Commercial Codel would replace a number of our present
statutes, most importantly the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the
Bank Collection Code and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. All of these
statutes are, to varying degrees, in need of revision. It is, however,
especially true of these parts of the Code that no sweeping law reform
is accomplished. The Code is more in the nature of a technical changes
act which clarifies language where ambiguities or conflicts have appeared
and extends the basic principles to cover situations which were not
considered by earlier drafters of uniform legislation. There -is immense
room for improvements of this kind in our present statutes. It is probably
wise, however, that the drafters of the Code elected to stop short of drastic
reform, for the present structure of our banking, commercial paper and
investment securities laws seems reasonably sound and the commercial
disruption which would be wrought by structural changes does not seem
warranted. The portions of the Code presently under discussion would
cause a minimum of disruption; indeed, it might almost be said that no
changes in current business practices would be required by the adoption
of the pertinent Articles 3, 4, 5 and 8.
Article 3-Crnmercial Paper.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was never a good statute.
It was poorly drafted: its sections are confusingly organized and confusingly
proliferated and duplicative of one another. No less than 67 sections relate
to presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest. Further, the Negotiable
Instruments Law has not been handled wisely by courts throughout the
United States. Because many of the lawyers and judges who handled
problems arising under the Negotiable Instruments Law were unaccustomed to thinking in terms of statutory law, many cases were decided
without any reference to the act and many more were decided in opinions
which referred to the Negotiable Instruments Law as merely declaratory
of the common law and then proceeded to a study of the prior law. Partly
as a result of this myopia, many conflicts developed in the cases interpreting
the Negotiable Instruments Law. These conflicts have made it impossible
to predict the outcome of many cases presenting questions which have
not been resolved authoritatively by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
'*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. These are Articles 3, 4, 5 and 8. This paper is a chapter of a report to the
Legislative Research Committee of the Wyoming Legislature. A revision of the
introductory portion of that report has already been published: it includes a general
history of the Code, which has now been enacted in five states. Carrington. A
Foreword to The Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L.J. 17 (1959).
None of the views expressed here are indorsed by the members of the Committee.
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FORM AND INTERPRETATION

There are no dramatic changes effected by this Part of the Code, but
there are six minor changes in policy from that prevailing under
the present Uniform Law which are worthy of mention. First, under
existing law it is clear that a written promise or order to pay which is
limited to payment out of a particular fund is not negotiable regardless
of the character of the fund.2 The Code would abolish this requirement
where the instrument is issued by a government or governmental agency
or unit." The present rule is a doctrinaire extension of the rule that a
negotiable instrument must contain an absolute promise or order to pay;
it serves no functional purpose and is a distinct handicap to local government financing for it denies negotiability to instruments payable from the
proceeds of a particular tax or from other sources of revenue. The change
would clearly be desirable, for it would improve the marketability of local
government issues.
Secondly, the Code reverses the same rule as applied to instruments
issued by a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or estate which
are payable out of the entire assets of the issuer. 4 Again the present rule
is doctrinaire and useless, and the change would be a useful facilitation of
business conducted by partnerships, unincorporated associations, trusts or
estates.
A third change expands the requirement of existing law that a
negotiable instrument must be payable at a definite time. The present
Uniform Law defines "payable at a definite time" to include instruments
payable upon an event certain to happen but uncertain as to time.r. The
Code reverses this rule.6
The offical Comment explains that:
Almost the only use of such instruments has been in the
anticipation of inheritance or future interests by borrowing on
post-obituary notes. These have been much more common in
England than in the United States. They are at best questionable
paper, not acceptable in general commerce, with no good reason
for according them free circulation as negotiable instruments.
As in the case of the occasional note payable "one year after the
war" or at a similar uncertain date, they are likely to made under
unusual circumstances suggesting good reason for preserving
defenses of the maker.
The change seems clearly desirable.
A fourth change, or group of changes, deals with the effect of acceleration provisions on the negotiability of commercial paper. Frequently,
creditors will wish to reserve the right to accelerate the maturity of instru2. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 3, WS 13-289.
3. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-105 (1) (g). All references are to the 1957 Official
Text.
4. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-105 (1) (h).
5. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 4(3), WS 13-290(3).
6. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-109(2).
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ments upon default, or upon the impairment of the value of* the security,
or because of the impending insolvency of the maker. Present law fails
to clarify the effect of such provisions on the negotiability of the instrument
and the courts have struggled for many years, with frequently conflicting
results, to fit various kinds of acceleration provisions within the language
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The Code expressly and simply
approves all acceleration clauses provided that the instruments are otherwise payable at a definite time.' Consistent with this policy decision, the
Code reverses the old rule . and permits a clause authorizing sale of
collateral upon any default of the maker and not just defaults at maturity.9
The Code likewise permits a clause requiring the maker to maintain the
collateral upon pain of accelerated maturity;' 0 such a clause would seem to
render the instrument non-negotiable under existing law. The policy
judgment favoring the negotiability of instruments containing acceleration
provisions seem wise. Debtors are adequately protected against capricious
and needlessly embarrassing acceleration by their bargaining power and
by the absolute requirement, imposed by the Code, that creditors exercise
their power "in good faith."" There is a genuine business need for
acceleration provisions and there is no sound reason why their use should
impair negotiability.
A fifth change alters the responsibility of makers of incomplete instruments. Under existing law, it is curiously safe to sign a whole book of
blank checks. If the blank check is delivered by the maker, the bearer is
authorized to complete it and a subsequent holders in due course can
And likewise, a completed
enforce i'. according to the terms supplied.1
check which is not delivered but stolen from the maker can be enforced
as a negotiable instrument by a holder in due course.13 It is therefore
anomalous that the two circumstances together-incompleteness and failure
of delivery-provide the maker with a defense against subsequent holders
without notice.' 4 This present rule seems clearly wrong. The man who
executes blank checks should be the one to bear the risk that they will
be stolen and completed, and not the subsequent purchaser who cashes
the checks for the thief. This is the result under the Code:' 5 the maker
must, bear the risk so long as the contents of the paper at the time he
signs it indicate that it is intended to become an instrument. This qualification is a reasonable limitation which protects one who simply signs
his name to a blank paper with no expectation that his signature will
later come to have commercial significance. The change thus removes a
7.
8.
9.

10.
11,
12.

13.
14.
15.

Uniform Commercial Code § 3-109(1) (c).
Uniform Negotiable Instruments law § 5(l), WS 13-291 (1).
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-112(I) (b).

Uniform Commercial Code § 3-112(1) (c).
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203.
Uniform Negotiable Instruments l.aw § 1.1, WS 13-300.
Wyo. 88, 284 P.2d 400 (1955).
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 16, WS 13-302.

Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 15, WS 13-301.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-115.

See State v. Grider, 74
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perplexing curiosity from the present law and offers a desirable stimulus
to the free circulation of commercial paper.
The sixth change relates to the interpretation of instruments which
are payable to persons identified as agents or officers. The customary expectation of makers of such instruments is that they will be payable to the principal of the agent or officer as well as named payee. But this is not the result
prescribed by our present statute'
unless the agent or officer happens
to be a cashier or fiscal officer of a bank or corporation. The Code makes
all such instruments payable to the principal of the payee and authorizes
the named payee to act as holder.'7 This is more in accord with the
probable expectations of the parties and hence it is more sound than
the present rule.
This Part of Article 3 also makes a number of technical improvements in the language and organization of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Many of these improvements are intended to resolve specific
controversies concerning the meaning of existing provisions; indeed no less
than nineteen such disputes would be resolved by this Part alone. Such
clarifications may be the most useful service afforded by the Code to
Wyoming law.
For example, there is presently a dispute as to whether a note which
contains a reference to a separate security agreement is negotiable. There
should be a ready answer to this question but the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law does not supply it. Most courts which have faced the
problem have recognized the reference as an informative record only,
which does not impair negotiability or put subsequent holders on notice
of possible defenses which might arise out of the separate agreement. But
a few courts have reasoned that such a reference incorporates into the note
all the terms of agreement referred to, and makes the promise to pay
conditional upon performance of that agreement. There is very little to
be said for this minority view, but it does raise a cloud of doubt about the
law in Wyoming, where the question has never been authoritatively decided, 18 which would be removed by adoption of the Code.' 9
None of these nineteen questions have been resolved in Wyoming,
so that it might be said that adoption of this Part of the Code would spare
us the expense of nineteen appellate cases. For the most part, these
questions are all like the rules of the road-it is much more important
that they be firmly resolved than -that they be "rightly" resolved. Because
these nineteen clarifications are minor, technical, and possessed of very
little policy content, it seems unduly burdensome to the readers to include
here a complete explanation of all of them. The official Comments pro16.
17.
18.
19.

Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 42, WS 1-328.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-117 (a).
The majority view is consistent with the holding in Brown v. Cow Creek Sheep Co.,
21 Wyo. 1, 126 Pac. 886 (1912).
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-105 (l) (e).

VvoMING

LAw JOURNAL

vide a complete explanation for anyoiic who may have a special interest
in them.2 0
One other feature of this Part of the Code needs mention. In some
communities, an instrument made payable at a bank is accepted as an
order to the bank named to pay the instrument. In other communities,
such an instrument is accepted more literally and is taken only to identify
a place of payment. The drafters of the Code have elected not to try to
resolve this conflict and Section 3-121 is offered alternatively to accord with
either view. The five states which have at this writing adopted the Code
have adopted Alternative A which treats such instruments as orders to
pay. This is in accord with a special Wyoming statute,2' and it is this
Alternative which would be appropriate for this state. It may be regretted
that the drafters of the Code did not adopt Alternative A, for it would
certainly seem to be an appropriate subject for uniformity.
PARTS

2

AND

3:

TRANSFER, NEGOTIATION
RIGHTS OF HOLDERS

AND THE

These two inter-related Parts of Article 3 would effect four significant
changes in existing law. First, under existing law, it appears that an
instrument payable to a person under a name other than his own or a
name which is misspelled, may be effectively indorsed by the payee in
either the name set forth in the instrument or in his own name. This
rule is continued under the Code, but the indorsee is given the right to
insist upon indorsement in both names.2 2 The indorsee does not have this
right under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, but the double
indorsement is clearly the only way to prevent confusion and the indorsee
should have the right to insist upon it. The change is therefore desirable.
Second, the Code resolves much confusion about conversion of bearer
paper to order paper by special indorsement.' Bearer paper is paper which
can be negotiated by delivery without indorsement. Section 9 (5) of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law provides than an instrument is
payable to bearer "when the only and last indorsement is an indorsement
in blank." Section 40, on the other hand, provides that bearer paper
which is specially indorsed payable to a special person may nevertheless be
negotiated by simple delivery. There has been considerable confusion
and conflict about the application of these two sections, but the emerging
rule seems to be that Section 40 applies only to paper which is originally
20.

(1)

§ 3-102, Comment 2

(11)

§ 3-110, Comment 1

(2)

(12)

§ 3-110, Comments 2 & 3

(4)

§ 3-104, Comment 1
§ 3-105. Comment I
§ 3-105, Comment 2

(14)

(5)

§ 3-105, Comment 3

(15) § 3-112, Comment 4

(2)

21.
22.

(6) § 3-105, Comment 4
(7) § 3-106, Comment I
(8)
§ 3-107, Comment I
(9) § 3-108, Comment
(10) § 3-109, Comment 4
WS 13-37.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-203.

(13) § 3-110, Comment 5

(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)

§ 3-111, Comment I
§
§
§
§

3-113,
3-118,
3-119,
3-122,

Comment
Comment I
Comment 5
Comment 2
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payable to bearer. Thus, original bearer paper must remain always thus,
but paper which is originally order paper may be converted from the one
to the other by each successive indorsement. The Code resolves all the
conflict and abandons the rule of Section -10 by providing that the signature
of a special indorsee is always necessary to negotiation. - 3 This change
may be criticized. Should the transferee of a check or note which is
payable to bearer be charged with the duty of consulting the reverse side
of the instrument to consider any special indorsements? Arguably not.
but the Code solution to the problem seems acceptable for two reasons.
First, the purpose of Section 40 was to protect the issuer of bearer bonds
from the burden of worrying about indorsements when time came for
payment; this purpose is otherwise served by the Code in Article 8 which
gives special treatment to investment securities. And, absent this consideration, the question does not seem to be too important so long as it
is clearly resolved. The Code does seem to remove all doubts. On balance,
therefore, the Code section is clearly an improvement.
Third, the Code alters the effect of a restrictive indorsement. A
restrictive indorsement is one which prohibits further transfer, or is conditional, or indicates a purpose of deposit or collection, or otherwise
states that it is not for the benefit of the indorsee. Under the existing
law, such a restrictive indorsement destroys the negotiability of the instrument.2 4 The Code recognizes that this rule is an unreasonable handicap
to banks engaged in the process of collection and accordingly provides
that a holder who takes under or after a restrictive indorsement must
apply the proceeds of the instrument consistently with the indorsement,
but to the extent that this is done such a holder may be a holder in due
course.2 5 Thus the banks engaged in collection, all save the first depositary
bank, are free of responsibility for the performance of the restriction.
Likewise, if the restrictive indorsement is made for the benefit of the
indorser or a third party, the indorsee is bound to apply the proceeds
according to the restriction, but subsequent holders are not exposed to
the peril that the indorsee may fail to do so. Only if the subsequent
holder has knowledge of a breach of duty by the indorsee is he denied
the protections afforded the holder in due course. The Code provision is
an improvement on the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law; the interests
of the restrictive indorser are adequately protected under the Code without
giving the restrictive indorser the unfair and unnecessary advantage he
now holds over innocent subsequent holders.
The fourth change pertains to stale checks. The Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law provides that one who takes an instrument "an unreasonable time" after issue cannot be a holder in due course.2
The Code
preserves this rule, but adds an important presumption that a domestic
23.
24.
25.
26.

Uniform
Uniform
Uniform
Uniform

Commercial Code 1 3-204 (1).
Negotiable Instruments Law § 37, WS 13-323.
Commercial Code § 3-206(l) and (4).
Negotiable Instruments Law § 53, WS 13-338.
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check that is thirty days old in stale.2 7

This is a shorter period than that

usually found to be "unreasonable" under existing law, but it seems to be
abundantly long in the jet age.
As with Part 1,the most numerous changes wrought by Parts 2 and 3
are those which clarify and reorganize the existing law and its meaning
Again, most of these are minor, technical and possessed of little policy
content and the reader is simply referred to the Official Comments which
pr6vide adequate explanation to those who may have a special interest
in them. 2'
Two of these "clarifications" may however, for different
reasons, bear examination here.
Section 3-307 is an excellent example of the sort of improvements
which are wrought by the Code. It replaces Section 59 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law which cryptically provides:
WHO DEEMED HOLDER IN

DUE COURSE

Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has
negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the
holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
acquired title as a holder in due course. But the last-mentioned
rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the
instrument prior to the acquisition of such defective title.
Section 3-307 renders essentially the same rule. But first, paragraph (1)
adds new matter which clarifies and codifies the rules concerning the
burden of proof in establishing signatures; this paragraph is largely declaratory of existing case law in other states, and is consistent with the
philosophy of a narrower Wyoming statute,2 9 that one who challenges the
authenticity of a signature should do so promptly in order that the holder
will not be surprised and, will have an.opportunity to gather proof on the
question. In order that .the reader may compare for himself the technique
of the two statutes, it seems desirable here to provide the whole text of
Section 3-307:
BURDEN

OF

ESTABLISHING SIGNATURES,
DUE COURSE

DEFENSES,

AND

(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleading each signature on
an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of.a signature
is put in issue,
(a) The burden of establishing it is on the party claiming
under the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized
except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a pur-

ported signer who has died or become incompetent before
proof is required.
27.
28.

29.

Uniform Commercial Code § 3-304 (3) (c).
(1) § 3-201, Comment 3
(2) § 3-202, Comment 5
(3) § 3-202, Comment 6
(4) § 3-202, Comment 2
WS 13-29.

(5) $
(6) §
(7) §
(8) §

3-304,
3-304,
3-305,
3-305,

Comment
Comment
Comment
Comment

6
11
1
7
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(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of
the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that defense exists a person claiming the
rights of a holder in due course has the bruden of establishing
that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course.

The foregoing Section 3-307 is inlall respects a superior statute to that
presently in force in Wyoming. Unlike the present statute, it is possessed
of a title which gives some hint of its contents. It is more comprehensive
and anticipates and resolves many questions which might arise in the
interpretation of Section 59. Its diction is clearer, and it is much better
organized. Although it brings no significant changes in the substance of
the law, the adoption of this section would effect a significant improvement
in Wyoming law. This is equally true of many other sections of the Code.
Another section of the Code which is simply declaratory of the present
law is Section 3-202 (3) which would replace Section 32 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. The Code provision reads:
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it
conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less it operates only as a partial assignment.
This section improves on the language of Section 32 and is mentioned here
only because it is thought that further improvement might be possible.
The Code, as quoted above, permits the partial indorsement to operate
as a partial assignment, but leaves open the question of the effect of a
partial assignment. The Official Comments explain that this question
is left to the local law of contracts. But the Wyoming case law is silent
on the question of the validity and effect of partial assignments and there
isconsiderable diversity in other jurisdictions as to the applicable rules.
It has been most often held that a partial assignment of a contract is valid
as between the parties, but that an obligor may not be compelled to
perform piecemeal: an action against the obligor to enforce the contract
must therefore join all interested parties as plaintiffs. This seems to be a
sound rule and one that might be usefully codified insofar as it applies
to commercial paper. Such a codification might well spare Wyoming
litigants and courts a significant expense of time and money. It is therefore suggested that consideration be given to amending Section 3-202 (3)
to read as follows:
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If it conveys less,
it is operative only as a transfer and, if the payor has not contracted to make a partial performance, no legal proceeding can be
maintained by the partial transferee against the payor unless all
persons having an interest in the instrument are joined in the
proceeding.
This report does not suggest that it will be feasible to modify the Code
so as to resolve all possible questions pertaining to the field of commercial

\\'toMi.m(, L.%iv jouRNm.
law, linor toes it cvel

suggest Ihat al C'fot should be made to resolve :aS
many questions ;is possible. The Code should not be cluttered with a
large nimber of local aineiith nents which woultd disrupt the internal
harmony' of the stattie anti do a disservice to the cause of interstate
tiiiformity'. But there may be ;a few instanccs where narrow, technical,
but significant and tisettlcd, questions may be useftlly resolved without
harim to tie Code and without itrodtuction of broad, legislative policy
(onsiderations which might win new enemies for what is presented to us
is a techn ical law reforill. Sc('ion 3-202 (l) seems to be one such opportuntity.
PA.\RT -1:

LIABLInTY OF

PIARIES

This Part of Article 3 would replace the weakest portions of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, which is curiously sketchy in defining
the liability of the various parties to negotiable instruments. Much of this
Part is therefore devoted to entirely new material, which is largely declaratory, of existing case law not heretofore codified. For instance, outr
present statutes are silent oil the liability of a giarantor of a negotiable
instrument. The (:ode, codifies the case law and makes one change of
substance. That is that a holder in due course under the Code takes
free of the guarantor's personal defenses as well as the maker's or indorser's. "' This 'change is consistent with the general purpose of the law
of negotiability and is therefore a desirable removal of an anomaly which
prevails under our present statutes. The guarantor is, on the other hand,
assured by the Code of recourse against his principal;aI this is an equitable
right which th guarantor certainly should have, but the courts seemed to
find some difficulty in affording it under the present law. The clarification should therefore be a welcome one which would benefit guarantors.
This Part of the Code would also bring some changes in the present
statutes. First, there are some changes in the law pertaining to the formalities and consequences of acceptance of a bill of exchange. Sections 161-170
of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law pertain to acceptance for
honor; this is an obsolete practice and the sections which provide for it
are therefore omitted. The Code would require that an acceptance be
written on the draft;3 2 this provision eliminates the obsolete and commercially impractical custom of "collateral acceptance."
The separate
writing by which a drawee undertakes to pay a draft no longer will operate
as an acceptance of it and reliance must be placed on the separate writing
itself, as in the case of a letter of credit. The present statute treats the
separate writing as ;n acceptance, although this serves no useful purpose
and create unneccssary opportunities for confusion and fraud; the chanige
is therefore desirable.
,30.

31.
32.

U niform Commercial Code § 3-416 makes the guarantor a party to the instrument
so that the rules of holding in due course apply to him. The Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law makes no provision for such a party and the guarantor's defenses
are therefore cut off only if he guarantees as an indorser or co-maker.
This follows from the same § 3-416.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-410(1).
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The Code alters slightly the consequences of an acceptance which
varies the terms of the draft. If the holder assents to such an acceptance,
the drawer and indorsers are discharged, unless they also assent. Under
33
the Code, this assent must be affirmatively expressed by the prior parties;
under present law, their silence alone is sufficient to prevent the discharge.3 4 The Code rule seems to be the fairer and to be more consistent
with the expectations of the drawer and indorsers. The Code would
abolish the rule of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law which
provides that refusal to return a bill presented for acceptance operates as
Such a refusal operates under the Code as
a constructive acceptance. 35
a conversion of the instrument, so that the holder has immediate recourse
against the drawee who refuses to return the instrument. :" ; This is a more
satisfactory remedy for the aggrieved holder because, under existing law,
lie has no remedy until the maturity date and no instrument which he
might negotiate meanwhile-hence his expectations in taking a negotiable
draft are defeated.
In addition to these provisions pertaining to acceptance, this Part of
the Code changes the rule pertaining to the effect of an innocent or
immaterial alteration of a negotiable instrument. Under existing law,
any alteration avoids the instrument, 3 7 under the Code, mere spoliation
does not.aR There is no apparent reason why the maker should be relieved
of liability on the instrument by innocent or immaterial alteration and
the Code rule therefore seems preferable. 39
The Code provides that one who contributes by his negligence to
the material alteration of an instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting such alteration or lack of
40
authority against the drawee or a subsequent holder in due course.
Insofar as this section pertains to the protection of drawees, it is declaratory
of a common law rule announced in 1827,41 but the extension of protection
to holders in due course is a change in existing law. The limitation in
the common law rule was based on a narrow concept of "duty of care,"
the theory being that the negligent maker or holder had no duty to the
subsequent holder. The limitation seems unnecessarily conceptualistic and
unjust and the changes therefore seems wise.
This Part of the Code also makes its share of technical minor improvements in existing statutes and resolves a number of conflicts in the case
Commercial Code § 3-412 (3).
Negotiable Instruments Law § 142, WS 13-428.
Negotiable Instruments Law § 137, WS 13-423.
Commercial Code § 3-419(1).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Uniform
Uniform
Uniform
Uniform

37.
38.
39.

Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 124, WS 13-410.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-407 (2).
The Code would not affect the result in cases like First National Bank v. Ford, 30
Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691 (1923), which held that the maker who asserts an alteration
has the burden of proving it.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-406.
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253 (1827).

40.
41.
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law concerning the construction of language. Again, of the Official Com42
ments which explain these clarilying provisions are cited.
PARTS 5 AND (i:

PRESEINTMENr,

NOTICE OF

DISHONOR,

PROTEST AND DISCHARGE

In contrast to the preceding Part of Article 3, these Parts are a
revision of the most ornate and prolix provisions of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law. The most important changes wrought by these Parts
would be the technical simplification of the sometimes almost savage
rituals required by the present law of a. holder making a presentment or
giving a notice of dishonor or protest. Again, there is no apparent need
for explaining these changes in detail; they are adequately explained in the
43
It is
Official Comments, if any reader finds a special interest in them.
sufficient here to note that any notice or demand that is adequate under
existing law is also adequate under the Code.
Some entirely new provisions were, however, also deemed desirable.
An example in Section 3-510 which codifies the rules of evidence pertaining
to proof of dishonor or notice of dishonor. New provisions are also found
in Section 3-606 which restates and expands the present codification of the
suretyship defenses which are available to indorsers and other parties to
44
negotiable instruments.
The Code makes a change in the law pertaining to the negotiation of
mature paper. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, one who
indorses an instrument after maturity is discharged unless there is a
prompt presentment and notice of dishonor. 45 Inasmuch as a negotiation
42.

43.

44.

45.

(1)
(2)

§ 3-404, Comment 3
§ 3-405, Comment 2

(8)
(9)

§ 3-418, Comment 2
§ 3-418, Comment 3

(3)

§ 3-408, Comment 2

(10)

§ 3-418, Comment 4

(4)

§ 3-413, Comment

(11)

§ 3-419, Comment 3

(5)
§ 3-415, Comment 3
(12) § 3-419, Comment 4
(13) § 3-419, Comment 5
(6) § 3-415, Comment 5
(7) § 3-417, Comment 9
(8)
§ 3-508, Comment 2
(1) § 3-501, Comment 4
(2) § 3-501, Comment 6
(9) § 3-508, Comment 4
(10) § 3-509, Comment 5
(3) § 3-503, Comment 3
(11) § 3-509, Comment 4
(4) § 3-504, Comment I
(12) § 3-509, Comment 5
(5)
§ 3-504, Comment 2
(13) § 3-511, Comment 6
(6) § 3-504, Comment 3
(7)
§ 3-504, Comment 4
(14) § 3-511, Comment 7
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-606 would overrule an old Wyoming case which
was not expressly overruled by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, but which
was clearly contrary to the weight of authority in other states. In Trabing v.
Commissioners of Albany County, 1 Wyo. 302, (1876), the plaintiff and one Finfrock had been co-sureties on a S1000 bond. Upon payment of $250, the Commissioners agreed to the discharge of Finfrock; they then sought to levy against
the plaintiff for the balance owing. The plaintiff sought to enjoin foreclosure on
on the ground that the discharge of Finfrock was also a discharge as to him. The
territorial court held that this was an appropriate occasion for the exercise of its
equity powers and required the plaintiff to pay another $250 to secure the discharge. This was contrary to the general rule that a discharge of one surety is a
discharge of all, and the Code provision which states this general rule would
operate to reverse the rule of the case. The Code does provide that the creditor
may protect himself in such a situation by expressly reserving his rights against the
remaining sureties and by promptly notifying them of the reservation.
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 7, WS 13-293.
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after maturity can have little purpose except fraud, the Code has taken
the position that such an indorsee is not entitled to the protection of
A related change pertains to the defense
these formal requirements.46
of payment against a holder in due course who takes mature paper. Under
present law, it would seem that a holder in due course takes an instrument
subject to the possible defense of payment, for payment discharges the
instrument. 4 7 This is manifestly Unfair for the loss should fall upon the
payor who failed to pick ip the instrument and destroy it at the time of
payment. Probably this result was not considered or intended by the
drafters of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the contrary
declaration of the Code48 is clearly a welcome one.
This latter change is part of the more sweeping abolition of the concept of "payment in due course," which is defined in Section 88 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Under existing law, a payor who
is notified of a claim by an indorser is put in a quandary: if he pays the
holder, he risks liability to the claimant and if he refuses payment, he
risks liability to the holder. The Code imposes on the claimant the
burden of the moving oar-he must either secure an injunction against
payment or post security to protect the payor. 49 These provisions are similar
to those found in the Wyoming Statute " ' which protect the carrier who is
notified of a claim against the holder of an order bill of lading.
Finally, charges are made in the law pertaining to a delay in presentment of an instrument. The Code limits the consequences of a delay: the
drawer of the bill would be discharged only to the extent of the loss
occasioned by delay and this result is to be achieved by means of an assignment to the holder of the drawer's right against the drawee who failed to
pay upon delayed presentment. 5 1 Also, the Code redefines the timeliness
of a presentment of a check. Existing law indicated that a "reasonable
time" for the presentment of a check is one day.5 2 This period is unreasonably short for merchants who handle many checks or for farmers
or ranchers who do not have ready access to a bank, and the Code specifically extends this period to 30 days insofar as it relates to liability of the
53
drawer and 7 days insofar as it relates to the liability of an indorser.
PARTS

7

AND

8:

ADVICE OF INTERNATIONAL SIGHT DRAFT
AND MISCELLANEOUS

These brief Parts of Article 3 are intended to pick up a few loose
ends left by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and by the Preceding Parts of Article 3. A few questions which persist at present concerning the effect of an instrument on the vitality of the underlying
46.
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obligation are resolved.i a A procedure for "vouching in" prior parties to
negotiable instruments is assured.:':' And a procedure for collection of
lost, destroyed or stolen instrument is provided. 56 The three sections
mentioned seem to be the only portions of these Parts of the Code which
hold significant interest for Wyoming lawyers or businessmen.
Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections
The changes in Wyoming law which would be wrought by adoption
of this Article arc fewer, narrower, and less significant than those effected
by the preceding Article. Perhaps the most important single provision of
Article 4 is Section 4-102 which provides that the liability of a bank for its
activities in connection with the collection process is to be measured by
the law of the place where the bank is situated. This is a highly beneficient
change from the existing case law, for it affords bankers with a new
measure of certainty as to the nature of their responsibilities. It is.perfectly fair to drawers, payees and indorsers who must know that action is
likely to be taken with respect to an ambulatory instrument almost anywhere, and who cannot therefore be said to be surprised or disappointed to
find their rights measured by the law of the situs of the bank who handles
or pays the instrument.
The substance of Article 4 may be considered in two parts. The
portion dealing with the relation of bank to 'customer, which would
replace a few local statutes, is largely declaratory of existing common law,
but does contain a few policy judgments as to the extent and nature of
the bankers' responsibilities. There has heretofore been no uniform
legislation whatever on this general subject, although harmony does seem
to be appropriate and desirable. The other portion, dealing with collection procedures, is largely technical and most of its changes are designed to
simplify the process of bank handling of. commercial paper. The need
for uniformity in this area is pressing, but for reasons that are unclear
that objective has never been achieved. The Code does replace the
American Bankers' Association's statute, the Bank Collection Code, which
was adopted in Wyoming in 1931, but which failed of adoption in many
states.
Relation of Bank and Customer
The Code would effect five changes in the existing Wyoming law concerning the responsibility of the bank to its customers. First, there would
be a slight change in the liability of a bank for wrongful dishonor of a
check. The policy of the present statute, is that the bank should be
liable only for actual damage resulting from the dishonor. -7 This policy
is continued under the Code, except that it is made clear that the damage
54.

Uniform Commercial Code § 3-802.

55.
56.

Uniform Commercial Code § 3-803.
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-804. This would not change the result in cases like
Caswell v. Ross, 27 Wyo. 1, 188 Pac. 977 (1920), where the plaintiff's testimony
was not sufficiently persuasive that there had ever been an instrument and judgment
was therefore rendered against her.
WS 13-30.
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may be caused through an arrest or prosecution resulting from the wrongful dishonor and that the questions of causation of damage is one of fact.51
Secondly, the Code would alter the present law relating to the vitality
of a stop order. Under existing law, a stop order is binding on the bank
for 90 days and may be renewed only in writing, each renewal in turn
being binding for the same period of 90 days. 59 The Code reduces the
period of validity of an oral stop order to 14 days, but extends the life of a
written order or renewal to six months.ro
These changes are not too
important, but seem acceptably desirable. The oral stop order is a burden
to the bank which it shotld not have to bear for a long period without a
written record supplied by the depositor; for a written order, on the other
hand, it may be an unreasonable burden on the depositor to require
quarterly renewals. The distinction between oral and written orders is
one which has considerable factual justification from the viewpoint of the
bank which must respond to them.
Thirdly, the Code would reverse the common law rule, which presumably prevails in Wyoming, to the effect that the death or incompetence
of a depositor stands as an immediate revocation of the authority of the
bank to pay items thereafter presented. This rule imposes the burden
on a bank of bearing the risk that the maker of every check it pays may
have died or become incompetent and thereby revoked the bank's authority.
The Code more wisely provides that the bank must have a reasonable
opportunity to learn of the death or disability before it becomes operative
as a revocation, and that even with notice the bank may pay items for
ten days after a stop order is received from the representative of the
deceased. 61
An existing Wyoming Statute provides in part:
No bank shall be liable to a depositor for the payment by it
of a forged or raised check or forged indorsement of any check
unless within thirty days after the return to the depositor of the
voucher of such payment such depositor shall notify the bank that
62
the check so paid was forged or raised.
The comparable Code provision is much more ornate. 3 In lieu of the
thirty day limit, the Code provides that the depositor must exercise due
care and promptness in examining his statements; thus in many instances
the depositor will become bound to accept the forgery or alteration in
less than thirty days. In the event of extenuating circumstances, however,
the Code provides much longer maximum limitations, which take effect
without regard to the due care of the depositor: one year for discovery of
forged signature or alternation and three years for discovery of a forged
indorsement. The Code furthermore provides that the negligent depositor
58.
59.
°
60.
61.
62.
63.
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is precluded from asserting not only the unauthorized signature or alteration which in the first instance he failed to discover, but also any other
unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer which is paid
in good faith by the bank in reliance upon the silence of its depositor.
These more complex Code provisions seem preferable to the existing law
which is too simple and direct to deal fairly with the many variant situations
which may arise to present the problem dealt with. For example, the
absolute limit of 30 clays within which the depositor must discover a forged
indorsement may in many instances depri're the depositor of a fair chance
to protect himself. On the other hand, the 30 days may be far longer than
a depositor may reasonably need to discover many false charges to his
account.
One further change may affect the relation of bank to depositor only
indirectly. It appears that a bank may, tinder existing law, waive its
rights to charge the depositor who negligently fails to discover the false
debit and proceed against the collecting bank which warranted the indorsement. The Code would preclude such a waiver and extends the protection
afforded the payor to include collecting banks as well; if the payor elects
to waive its rights, it cannot, under the Code, thereafter assert the same
unauthorized inclorsement against the collecting bank.6 4 It would seem
that the collecting bank should be entitled to the same protection as the
payor bank and the change therefore seems desirable.
Finally, the Code would limit the power of the bank to disclaim its
responsibilities to depositors. Section 4-103 (1) provides:
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by
agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary
care or can limit the measure of damages for such lack or failure;
but the parties may be agreement determine the standards by
which such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable.
The extent to which this Section is a change in existing law is doubtful.
To be'sure, many courts have held limitations of liability written into
stop order forms invalid without benefit of any statute and on a number
of grounds. The statute seems unobjectionable except on an irresponsible
and overreaching basis and a codification of the rules pertaining to such
disclaimers would seem to benefit bankers as well as depositors. At the
very least, this Section would add an element of certainty to the law of
Wyoming which does not now exist.
The Collection Process
None of the changes which the Code proposes to make in the law
pertaining to the collection process possess broad significance, but a number are perhaps worthy of mention. First, it should be noted that the
Code would reduce the significance of the oft-litigated question of whether
64.
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a particular bank is the owner of an item or the agent of the owner. The
Code extends the present presumption of agency to apply without regard
to the form of indorsenient or lack of indorsemient, l)ut also provides
that when an item is handled by a bank for the purpose of collection,
the statutory provisions apply even though the parties clearly indicate
that the bank takes the item as owner. This is a sensible change for,
as the official Comment 5 explains:
Where the tremendous volume of items handled makes impossible
the examination by all banks of all indorsements on all items
and where in fact this examination is not made, except perhaps
by depositary banks, it is unrealistic to base the rights. and
duties of all banks in the collection chain on variations in the
form of indorsements. It is anomalous to provide throughout
the ABA Code that the prima facie status of collecting banks is
that of agent or sub-agent but in Section 4 to provide that subsequent holders (sub-agents) shall have the right to rely on the
presumption that the bank of deposit (the primary agent) is
the owner of the item. It is unrealistic, particularly in this
background, to base rights and duties on status of agent or owner.
The Bank Collection Code streamlined the indorsement required of
a bank to a considerable degree by obviating the need for the legend
"prior indorsements guaranteed"; under existing law, such a guaranty is
presumed in a transfer from one bank to another.6 6 The Code takes the
next logical step and reduces the bank-to-bank indorsement to a number;
it provides that any indorsement which identifies the transferor is sufficient
to effect a transfer of the item from one bank to another, and all the usual
warranties can be inferred from such an indorsement.67 It would seem
that this change should ease slightly the burden of the transferor and thereby speed the collection process.
The Code would also liberalize slightly the requirements as to the
media which a collecting bank may accept as a remittance without exposing itself to liability as a guarantor of collection. Under the present
law 68 the collecting bank can accept almost any valuable paper except a
draft on the paying bank, which would be a device for extending credit
to the payor at the expense of the owner of the item. The Code would
relax this limitation to permit acceptance of a cashier's check of a remitting
bank which is a member of the same clearing house or group as the collecting bank; 69 this change is made because this is just'as satisfactory a
means of settlement through a clearing house as any other commercial
paper would be and may. in some instances, be a means to achieve greater

speed in clearing.
Perhaps the most desirable change which the Code would bring to
6.5.
66.
67.
6R.
69.
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the law of bank collections is the resolution of the much abused question
(i when a paymnt becomes final. This question is one of importance in
determining the priority of items, notices, stop-orders, legal process and
set-offs and is the point at which many provisional settlements become
final. No fewer than ten different rules have been employed by courts
to resolve this question and the Bank Collection Code leaves the problem
in profound confusion. 70 The Code lists a number of acts by the payor
bank which will constitute final payment and thereby resolves the doubts.73
In general, the test is whether the payor bank has manifested a decision to
pay the item. This test is fairest to payor banks and does not prejudice
the rights of owners or of collecting banks because of the payor's duty to
honor or dishonor the item within the time limits otherwise provided.
It has become common practice for depositary banks to supply the
missing indorsement of its customer when he neglects to provide it, but
this custom is not sanctioned by existing law and questions can arise
concerning the authority and responsibility of a bank which takes the
instrument later in the process of collection in reliance upon such an unantrhorized indorsement. The Code specifically authorizes a depositary
bank to supply the missing indorsement in the absence of contrary instructions by the maker. 72 The prevailing practice is clearly sound: it is useless and dilatory to return the item for indorsement by the customer. The
Code provision is therefore a desirable one.
The Code gives a collecting bank implied authority to grant a oneday extension to the payor bank for the purpose of securing payment of
an item which would otherwise be dishonored.73
The purpose of this
provision is to permit the collecting bank to give solvent payors a chance
to cover overdrafts. A bank which indulges in such a practice under
existing law risks liability to prior parties and the discharge of secondary
parties. The change seems desirable from the viewpoint of all the parties
involved, all of whom are interested in securing payment.
Sections 4-202 and 4-212 contain optional provisions which have been
adopted in the five states which have enacted the Code which would
authorize intermediary or payor banks to return unpaid items directly to
the depositary bank. This would short-circuit the complex routing which
the collection process sometimes takes and thereby hasten the return. Particularly with reference to unpaid instruments, speedy handling is very
desirable. There seems to be no virtue in requiring that the item return by the same circuitous route which it may have followed and the
change therefore seems desirable.
Finally the Code would add new provisions which regulate the
handling of documentary drafts payable by parties other than banks.
70. Bin see Bank Collection Code
71.
Uniform Commercial Code 1
72. Uniform Commercial Code §
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One change permits the bank handling such an instrument to make a
presentment by notifying the primary party that the instrument is held
at the bank for acceptance or payment as the case may be.7 4 This eases
the burden of the bank which need no longer follow the obligor around
town to make presentment. Part 5 of Article 4 contains new provisions,
which are largely declaratory of existing common law, concerning the
rights and liabilities of banks handling such drafts.
Obviously, these changes are minor and will have no significant
effect on collection procedures presently employed by Wyoming banks.
A number of disputes which might arise during the course of the present procedures may however be resolved in advance by adoption of
Article 4 of the Code and this is the principal benefit to be obtained
from its enactment in Wyoming.
Article 5-Letters of Credit
A letter of credit is a device now seldom used in Wyoming. In general terms, it is an undertaking by a bank or other person to meet the
yet unassumed obligations of a customer whose credit is thus assured.
There are two principal kinds of letters of credit. A documentary letter
of credit is one in which the issuer's obligation is conditioned upon
presentment of documents of title which may be used to secure reimbursement of the issuer by its customer. This type of letter of credit is generally issued by a bank to a seller of goods and affords a relatively cheap,
convenient means of financing a sale; it is the most satisfactory means
of third-party financing of a sales transaction where the buyer and seller
are unknown to one another and who are therefore likely to need the
sound credit of a bank to provide a basis for dealing. It is therefore not
surprising to find that documentary letters of credit are very common in
international trade. The other kind of credit is known as a "clean" letter
of credit: the obligation of the issuer to pay is not conditioned upon a
presentment of documents. This type of credit is most useful to travelers
and is a cheaper, more flexible device than the travelers' check, which
is more common.
This Article of the Code would codify the rules pertaining to letters
of credit which have become settled under the case law of New York,
Massachusetts and California, where there has been some litigation concerning them, and under the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits promulgated by the International Chamber of
Commerce in 1951. The Article is not as comprehensive as the other
Articles of the Code and a number of questions, particularly concerning
interpretation and the problem of defining the adequacy of documentary
presentment, are left open. The theory of the sponsors of the Code was
that the letter of credit is an instrument still in the process of development and that complete codification would be premature. On the other
74.
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hand, it was felt that some questions which were settled might be usefully
codified.
Time might well prove this brief Article to be among the most beneficial portions of the Code to Wyoming bankers and businessmen. The
letter of credit is potentially a useful device which is now largely unknown; the Code would familiarize us with the instrument and clarify
many of the consequences of its use and thus open up a new pattern for
commercial transactions for bankers and businessmen who might choose
to take advantage of it.
Article 8-Investment Secmrities
This Article would replace the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which
was adopted in Wyoming in 1945, and also the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law insofar as it applied -to transfers of bonds. The Code
provisions are not a blue sky law and do not purport to regulate the
responsibilities of issuers and sellers of securities for truthful representation or for the sound value of the issue, but only to provide for the
mechanics of transfer and the rights of the various parties to a transaction in investment securities. It has for some time been apparent
that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was not a satisfactory
statute insofar as it applied to bonds representing an investment; the
parties to such a bond are generally in a different relation to one another than the parties to an ordinary negotiable instrument, and the
same rules cannot be satisfactorily applied to both situations. For this
reason, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code sought to withdraw
bonds from the application of the general negotiable instruments rules
and treat them generically with other investment securities such as corporate shares.
Adoption of Article 8 would effect a number of changes in existing
law, but all of these changes need not be discussed here. A few of them
are simply extensions of changes made in the analagous rules pertaining
to negotiable instruments uhich were considered in our discussion of
Article 3I. For example, the changes made in the law pertaining to the
unauthorized completion of securities and to lost securities are very
much like the analogous changes made by Article 3, which we have
already considered and which would secure the same advantages over
existing law.75

There are also a number of technical changes which make

the law more consistent with the practices of the investment securities
business which have developed in the last quarter century. For example,
the Code would re-define the formal requirements of delivery so as to
make them more sensible in light of the modern practice and usages
of investment workers.7 6 And again, there are a number of clarifying
changes which would set aside some of the case law which has developed
75.
76.
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under the uniform acts in other jurisdictions; these changes are adequately explained in the Official Comments and we will adhere to the
77
practice of referring readers to these.
There are, however, a number of changes deserving of more careful
consideration and explanation. First, there is an entirely new provision
which would negate the defense of an issuer that a particular security
is an "overissue" not authorized by the corporate charter and therefore
not payable or issuable by the corporation. The Code provision would
require the issuer to obtain equivalent securities in the open market, if
available, or make restitution to the purchaser, in order to cover its obli78
It is
gation assumed under an instrument which it did in fact issue.
not clear to what extent this is a change in existing Wyoming law, but
it is clear that the old rule that a corporation is powerless to meet such
an obligation is needlessly conceptualistic and unfair and that the Code
)rovision is consistent with a general modern trend which prevents corporations from taking advantage of their own lack of authority in their
dealings with parties who are outside the internal framework of the organization.
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, an incorporation
by reference of the terms of another agreement robs the instrument of
negotiability. It is, however, almost necessary to incorporate into many
corporate bonds the terms of the trust indenture tinder which they are
issued, or else the instruments become unmanageably long. The result
has been that many purchasers of bonds have been deprived of the rights
of holders in due course because the instruments they purchased contained
such incorporations by reference. This result would be changed by the
Code which provides that an incorporation by reference of another document does not charge the purchaser with notice of a defect pertaining to
the validity of the instrument7 9 This seems to be a sounder and fairer
rule than that now prevailing under the Uniform Negotiable Instrument
Law.
The established rule that a holder in due course must take the instrument before maturity is another which has worked poorly as applied to
investment securities which may be subject to call for redemption or
exchange. The Code would modify the rule and preserve the negotiability of investment securities for a period after such a call.80
77.
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Still another general rule which would be modified by Article 8 is
the requirement that a holder in due course must take with all necessary
indorsements. Section 8-31 makes a distinction between the issuer's detenses and adverse claims of ownership. A perfect chain of indorsements
is not necessary to free the holder from the defenses of the issuer under
Section 8-202, but are necessary to protect him from the ownership claims
of third parties under Section 8-307. The reason for this special rule is
found in the fact that investment securities are so often held in the possession of brokers and are sold and delivered without necessary indorsemients; a purchaser under such circumstances is entitled to some protection
and there is no sound reason why the issuer should have its defenses
preserved because of the technicality of an absent indorsement.
The Code would absolve the indorser of an investment security of
secondary liability for the obligations of the issuer. As the Official Comment s ' explains:
In view of the nature of investment securities and the circumstances under which they are normally transferred an indorser cannot be held to warrant as to issuer's actions. As a transferor he,
of course, remains liable for breach of the warranties set forth in
this Article (Section 8-306).
It would seem unlikely that a purchaser of investment securities would
rely upon the secondary liability of an indorser or accommodation part),
in the absence of special circumstances, and certainly the ordinary transferor of securities does not expect to be held responsible for faithful
performance by the issuer, so the Code rule does seem more in accord
with the expectations of the parties than the present rule. And it should
be noted that where the parties wish to impose such a surety obligation
on the indorser, it may be expressly provided.
Finally, the Code would reverse the rule, which has developed in
the case law of other states, that a transfer agent cannot be held liable
by a holder or owner of a se, urity for his nonfeasance of duty in wrongfully refusing to register a transfer or to issue new securities. The Code
thus wisely recognizes that a transfer agent is more than an agent of the
issuer and has a semi-public responsibility which runs not only to the
issuer, but also to the holder or owner of the securities as well.s2
Article 8 leaves open two questions which have never been resolved
in Wyoming and which should perhaps be closed by a comprehensive
codification such as the Code. One question pertains to the extent to
which an issuer may restrict the transfer of securities. The Code does
provide that such a restriction is not effective against a purchaser with3
out notice unless it is conspicuously noted on the instrument," but the
81.
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basic question of the validity of restrictions is left open. On balance, this
omission is probably wise. All courts which have considered the question
have held that a restraint which amounts to a simple option to repurchasc
is valid; on the other hand, all are agreed that a total restraint is invalid.
l'ie question is one of drawing a line ald a nuumber of considerations are
entitled to weight: the extent of rhe restraint, the purpose of the restraint,
the nature and organization of the corporation. aml the extcnIt to wlhiclh
its shares are widely-held by investors. Any statutory provision which
would seek to state a rule for dctermining the validity of such restraints
must be either too general in tcrms to afford any certainty of application
or else too (,rude to handle fairly all the variant situations which might
arise. For tlis reason, it seens best to leave the question open so that
flexibility may be retained.
On the other hand, the second question which the Code leaves open
is one which should be answered. This pertains to the effect of a partial
transfer of an investment security. The Code provides that:
An indorsement purporting to be only of part of a security representing units intended by the issuer to be separately
transfer8 4
able is effective to the extent of the indorsement
This recognizes the validity of a partial transfer as between the parties,
but it fails to clarify the rights of a bona fide purchaser under a partial
indorsement to take free of adverse claims of ownership by third parties.
It is often necessary to make such a partial transfer as where the holder of
a certificate for 300 shares wishes to sell only 100 shares. The purchaser
of such an interest should be entitled to the protections afforded bona
fide purchasers if he has taken delivery of the certificate and the indorsements are otherwise in order. This protection could be specifically afforded by the addition of a paragraph (2) to Section 8-302 which would read
as follows:
Where a necessary indorsement purports to be only of part of a
security representing units intended by the issuer to be separately
transferable, the purchaser is a bona fide purchaser to the extent
permitted by such a partial indorsement.
This change in the Code would be a useful clarification of Wyoming law

and would not unduly burden the Code with superfluities.
CONCLUSION

These Articles of the Code would improve our present laws in many
ways. They would not dislocate present banking or coninnercial practices
but would rather give fairer and more certain legal protection to those
practices and could spare us considerable needless litigation. A study of
these Articles clearly supports the conclusion that the Code should be
adopted in Wyoming immediately.
84.
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